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INTRODUCTION
Social Darwinists of the 19th and early 
20th centuries used to argue that the rich 
flourished and the poor perished because of 
the operation of the biological principle of the 
survival o f the fittest. This was an early, 
crude attempt to provide a biological 
explanation for social phenomena - by 
misusing Darwin’s theory of evolution.
Biological explanations for human social 
behavior have been out of scientific favor for 
over 40 years. But in recent times they have 
come back into fashion - dressed up in 
modern scientific terminology, bolstered by 
genetic theory and new knowledge about 
animal behavior.
Most Australians are now-familiar with 
Jensen’s and Eysenck’s belief in the innate 
intellectual superiority of the white middle 
class. But Jensen and Eysenck are only the 
tip of the iceberg. A growing number of 
anthropologists, biologists, psychologists, 
philosophers are advocating a biological 
approach to human behavior; and a spate of
popular books has appeared which claim to 
show that violence, aggression, competition, 
male dominance, political hierarchies and 
elites are not the consequences of certain 
social relations, but are natural to the human 
species.
THE SOCIOBIOLOGISTS
A harvard professor, E.O. Wilson, in his 
book Sociobiology: A New Synthesis, 
heralds the formation of a new discipline 
called “ sociobiology” which he defines as 
“ the systematic study of the biological basis 
of all social behavior” .
Who are the sociobiologists? The best 
known are Wilson himself, whose book a 
reviewer in New Scientist called a model of 
the scientific method; Konrad Lorenz, who 
argues in On Aggression that aggression 
in humans is the manifestation of an 
instinctive drive; Robert Ardrey who 
presents “man” as an inherently violent, 
ignoble savage; L. Tiger and R. Fox who in 
Imperial Animal, Men in Groups try to 
show that many of our more undesirable
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characteristics: bossiness, sexism, violence, 
etc. have an evolutionary-genetic basis; John 
Bowlby who tries to establish a biological 
.basis for the mother-child relationship; 
Goldberg (Inevitability of Patriarchy) 
who argues that sexism is part of human 
nature; Elaine Morgan (Descent of 
Woman) who explains rape as a biologically 
selected response to a physiological 
difficulty.
As one would expect, there is among 
sociobiologists a natural urge to compete and 
form hierarchies. Those who regard 
themselves as respectable scientists readily 
attack “ popularisers” like Ardrey and 
Morgan. (Interestingly, Wilson reserves his 
harshest criticism s for Morgan, who 
purports to give a woman-centred account of 
the development of the human species.)
Nonetheless, there is a remarkable amount 
of agreement among sociobiologists of 
varying degrees of “ respectability” on what 
types of human behavior and what social 
institutions have an evolutionary-genetic 
basis. Aggression, bartering behavior, male 
dominance, competitiveness, violence, social 
hierarchies are on most lists. And the 
arguments in defence of the biological 
explanation are much the same from author 
to author.
SOCIOBIOLOGY AS SCIENCE
Sociobiologists argue that humans have 
n a tu r a l ,  i .e . g e n e t ic a l ly  ca u se d , 
p s y ch o lo g ica l ch a ra cte r is t ics  and 
behavioral propensities (e.g. to act 
aggressively when territory is invaded) and 
that these traits explain the existence of 
certain social institutions (e.g. war, football). 
How are we supposed to recognise which of 
our characteristics and institutions (if any) 
are biologically based? Sociobiologists 
typically use the following criteria:
1. U niversality : The trait or institution is 
found among people in every society. 
Male dominance, argue Tiger and Fox 
(Im p eria l A n im al) is such a social 
universal. But sociobiologists do allow 
that people may not act in accordance 
with their natural propensities. In fact, 
Fox and Tiger claim that one of the 
problems of modern society is that we are 
frequently inhibited from, doing what 
comes naturally.
So universality turns out to mean 
“ universal in hunter-gatherer societies” (in 
which our traits supposedly evolved), 
although Wilson points out that people can 
have biologically based characteristics 
which are not universal.
2. Unalterability: The trait must be 
unalterable, or at least, not easy to alter. 
(The fact that “equal opportunity” for 
women has not resulted in equality of the 
sexes indicates that male dominance is a 
permanent fixture - so say Tiger and 
Fox.) But when pressed, sociobiologists 
admit that people can control their 
natural urges (e.g. Lorenz suggests that 
morality can be a check on aggression), 
and that they can be redirected into 
harmless channels.
3. Existence of an animal analogue.
The trait is found in animals and animal 
societies, particularly in animals closely 
related to us, evolutionarily speaking. 
The argument is: that it is reasonable to 
suppose that we share genetically based 
behavioral traits with our animal 
relatives, just as we do genetically based 
physical attributes. Wilson adds, 
however, thatitis possible for humans to 
have genetically determined 
characteristics which are not shared by 
any animal.
The main problem with these criteria is 
that they are completely useless. Nothing 
whatsoever can be established using tests 
which contain so many escape clauses. For if 
a characteristic fails to pass all of the tests - if 
it is not unalterable or universal among 
humans and their animal relatives - 
sociobiologists can still claim it to be 
biologically based. And if we do find a 
characteristic which passes all three tests, 
this still doesn’t give us good grounds for 
saying that it is “natural” . A universal type 
of behavior in humans and animals may 
simply be a common response to the same 
environmental problem. Anyway, if the 
social behavior of apes or dolphins turns out 
to be much more like ours than we have 
supposed, it may be more plausible to suggest 
that their behavior requires a sociological 
explanation, rather than an evolutionary- 
genetic one. Nor does “unalterability” prove 
that a characteristic must have a biological 
cause. We know very little about how social 
conditions affect behavior, but we do know
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that traits which are socially caused can be 
extremely difficult to alter.
What these criteria do is to give 
sociobiologists absolute freedom to declare 
anything they like to be a natural human 
characteristic so that they can go forth freely 
to construct human nature without being 
hindered by the requirement of scientific 
testability. The way that sociobiologists 
build up their picture of the natural human 
confirms the suspicion that the drive behind 
sociobiology is a desire to believe that 
behavior com m only associated with 
competitive capitalism is natural and 
inevitable. For the natural propensities 
which they identify turn out to be the result of 
description rather than discovery.
You can take any piece of behavior, e.g. 
someone taking an examination in order to 
get into the public service; describe this 
behavior in an extremely general way - say, 
“competing for a position in a hierarchy” . 
What label you stick it under depends on 
what instincts you are pre-disposed to think 
humans have, it you prefer 10 believe thai all 
humans have a natural desire to seek a social 
role in which they can make a contribution to 
society through exercising their individual 
abilities, then you will describe the behavior 
accordingly. Now you have to find some 
examples of behavior in animals and in other 
human societies which can be given the same 
general description: “ competing for a 
position in a hierarchy” . Don’t worry if  you 
can’t seem to find something which fits the 
description exactly. You are allowed a wide 
latitude in what you count as competitive 
behavior or a hierarchy. Ignore accusations 
of cultural bias. Use your imagination. Next 
you will have to come up with some 
evolutionary explanation for this kind of 
behavior. Again this shouldn’t be difficult. 
Think of the survival value of being able to 
compete successfully for a high position; the 
way positions at the top make people more 
attractive sexually and enable them to breed 
and raise children with ease. Once you’re 
over this hurdle, you can congratulate 
yourself on identifying an element of human 
nature. For such a little bit of effort you’ve 
accomplished a great explanatory task. For 
you’re now not only able to explain the 
behavior of the examinee; you’re also able to 
explain hierarchies and competition.
Sociobiologists have a standard reply to 
their critics: particular hypotheses may
prove inadequate or vacuous, they say, but 
the thesis that some behavior is genetically 
caused is far more plausible than the position 
of the radical environmentalist who believes 
that all behavior is in all respects culturally 
determined.
After all, social arrangements in animal 
and human societies determine who can 
breed, and thus it is reasonable to suppose 
that the behavioral traits, as well as the 
physical features, possessed by the 
individuals who do the breeding are more 
likely to get passed on to further generations, 
thus tending to perpetuate the social 
a r r a n g e m e n ts  w h ich  a l lo w  su ch  
characteristics to succeed.
In attacking the radical environmentalist, 
the sociobiologists are attacking a position 
that virtually no one holds. But if you hold 
the more reasonable belief - that both genetic 
and environmental factors are responsible 
for human behavioral characteristics and 
dispositions, then you are not committed to 
the view that it is possible to identify which 
characteristics or part of a characteristic are 
due to genetic factors and which to the 
environment. You are not even committed to 
the view that it makes sense to think of 
characteristics as being divided up in this 
way. For it only makes sense to divide up the 
labor of the genes and the environment if 
what they contribute is what geneticists call 
‘additive’. If genetic and environmental 
factors interact in a complicated way - the 
one influencing and in turn being influenced 
by the other - the contributions of each 
cannot be separated any more than it can be 
determined (or makes sense to ask) which 
worKer made what part of a wall when one 
mixes the mortar and the other lays the 
bricks. The argument against radical 
environmentalism does not, therefore, make 
the position of the sociobiologist plausible. 
Indeed, a consideration of how genes operate 
makes it somewhat implausible.
further, being able to provide an 
evolutionary explanation for something, 
doesn ’t mean that an evolutionary 
explanation is correct or even meaningful. 
For the checks on what counts as a viable 
evolutionary explanation are weak, if not 
non-existent, in sociobiological literature. In 
fact, Wilson shows in his book that we can 
give evolutionary explanations for traits 
that are detrimental to the survival and
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breeding potential of an individual: A 
homosexual is not likely to do much 
breeding, but he/she is likely to contribute to 
the well-being of relatives by performing 
tasks for them, and since these relatives have 
a similar genetic constitution, they are likely 
to pass homosexual genes on to the next 
generation. Wilson provides a genetic basis 
for altruism and conformism in the same 
way. But what are the limits on explanations 
of this type? It seems that with a little 
ingenuity you can probably take almost any 
psychological trait or social institution and 
see it as in some way, directly or indirectly, 
contributing to the survival and well-being of 
either the individual or his/her relatives (in a 
hunter-gatherer society). As some of Wilson’s 
critics suggest, finding “ the evolutionary 
explanation” may make a good parlor game - 
but hardly good science.
SOCIOBIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY
There is clearly something wrong with 
sociobiology that goes beyond innocent 
intellectual confusion. Some of its critics (e.g. 
the “ Science for the People” group in the US) 
argue that sociobiology is a modern version 
of Social Darwinism, and that like its 
predeccessor, its function is an ideological 
one - to provide a pseudo-scientific rationale 
for particular social policies.
What of social and moral significance 
follows from the hypotheses o f sociobiology? 
The correct answer is “ Nothing” . Logically 
speaking, nothing of significance can come 
from  a vacu ou s th es is . Som etim es 
sociobiologists suggest that they are setting 
the limits of human behavior and social 
change. But, as we have seen, when pressed, 
they admit that humans can, and in our 
society probably generally do, act contrary to 
their biological programming.
Sometimes sociobiologists seem to be 
saying that bad consequences - unhappiness, 
frustration - result from suppression of 
natural propensities. But this, too, is dubious 
(even supposing that we do have natural 
propensities). For in a society so different 
from the primitive society in which our 
propensities supposedly evolved, it is more 
plausible to suppose that the best 
consequences come from acting naturally.
But we are dealing with something that is 
driven by needs and necessities which have
little to do with the laws ot logic. Marx in his 
time had to fight against the common belief 
that the economic behavior of people in a 
capitalist society was natural and 
unalterable. As long as the social basis o f an 
ideology remains, the ideology is likely to 
reappear in new disguises, however often it is 
logically refuted. Sociobiology is the latest 
resurrection of an old set of ideas; it is a 
theory which is likely to be received 
favorably by people who fear certain kinds of 
social change; those who want some weapon 
to use against women’s liberation, against 
radicals who criticise the existence of social 
hierarchies and elites, against those who 
think that we can build a society in which 
peace and co-operation is possible. It is no 
accident that the rebirth of the “human 
nature thesis” coincides with the growth of 
reactionary and anti-reform movements in 
many capitalist countries.
But there is another aspect to the late 20th 
century version of the ideology of naturalism 
which is revealed by Wilson when he thinks 
he is being most neutral and scientific, when 
he sees himself as providing an instrument 
for social planners.
The idea is that sociobiologists like other 
scientists provide inform ation to the 
managers and planners of society about how 
to manipulate people and their environment 
so that the desired results are achieved. Of 
course, to the extent that the theories are bad, 
they won’t work. But it is important to ask 
why people are attracted to theories like this - 
despite their obvious weaknesses, over­
simplifications and omissions. The answer, I 
think, is not simply that they support 
conservative ideas. The attractiveness of 
such hypotheses is that they fit in well with 
current ideas about social management and 
control, with the view that managing society 
is a technological task for experts who have 
on hand scientific theories about social 
phenomena. Wilson even suggests that 
determining the goals of social management 
is the job o f the sociobiologist. But is it 
legitimate to view the interaction between 
people, including interaction between rulers 
and the ruled in this way? Is it desirable to 
try to realise this basically anti-democratic 
and elitist model of social decision making? 
These are not simply questions for scientists, 
and they are not simply questions about 
facts, or the truth of theories.
